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Sublime and Anti-sublime: Reconsidering the Relation
of the Sublime to Technology
  Konstantinos Vassiliou 
Abstract
The aesthetic notion of the sublime has been traced in different fields in
the growing spheres of technology, capitalism, and digitality. The
variable character of the sublime is partly due to the fact that it is
identified with specific objects or sources. It can emerge whenever there
is an antithesis between the infinite extensions of reason and the limits
of the representative faculty. Taking into account this variance, this
article seeks to reexamine the relationship of the sublime to technology,
especially in view of current digital capabilities. In doing so, I argue that
the notion of the sublime involves its own peculiar traits for delimiting and
even blurring the boundaries between the natural and the technical. This
seems to be so because techniques and language may shift and
sometimes contest the incommensurability of reason and representation
that lies at the heart of the sublime. Moreover, this phenomenon is
countered by an anti-sublime effect (Manovich) that is achieved through
the extensive mapping and visualization abilities of digital media. In
contrast to the sublime, the anti-sublime is not based on contemplation
but on habitual behavior. By relating this characteristic of the anti-
sublime to the work of Félix Ravaisson, it finally seems that the sublime
has been significantly affected by digital culture and is likely to influence
any further demarcations between the natural and the technical.
Key Words 
anti-sublime; digital aesthetics; habit; Kant; Félix Ravaisson; sublime;
technology.
1. Introduction
The dynamic and, in many respects, daunting scale of modern
technology and metropolitan development-at-large has given rise to
several discourses on the sublime from different cultural and historical
perspectives. Jean-François Lyotard and Fredric Jameson have brought
forward inner affinities of the sublime with digital technology and
capitalism, providing valuable insights on how these elements are
imprinted in contemporary temporalities and subjectivities.[1] Mario
Costa and Vincent Mosco have explained how the sheer mass of the
interconnected mediascape is capable of generating tensions and
infatuations that are usually associated with the sublime.[2] Jeremy
Gilbert-Rolfe has described possible links between the sublime and
contemporary philosophical discourse, focusing on the ability of
technology to reshape the horizon of the post-human.[3] In addition, the
sublime has been traced within a great array of cultural and
technological practices from light-art to radio.[4]
The variance of these accounts bears testimony to a common trait and,
in some ways, even a problem when analyzing the relationship of the
sublime to cultural and social phenomena, namely that there is no
sublime object per se. That is because the sublime cannot actually be
considered identical to specific objects, natural or technical, and no
object inherently has a sublime character. The sublime arises only
through certain mismatches of rationality and imagination. This was one
of the key arguments of the Kantian analysis of the sublime, which still
remains the main philosophical reasoning on the subject. According to
Kant, there is no definite attribute of the sublime object since “sublimity
is not contained in anything in nature but only in our minds as we can
become conscious to nature within and also to nature outside us.”[5] This
does not disrupt the experiential aspect of the sublime but rather
enlarges its scope and variability. In addition, Kant presupposes that the
sublime can arise only from a repository of moral ideas, since “what we
call sublime will appear merely repellent to the unrefined person.”[6] One
that does not know or share these kinds of ideas will usually be
overcome with fear or repulsion against natural or artificial phenomena
that can generate the feeling of the sublime.
Given these intellectual and perceptual complexities, it should be noted
that mere enthusiasm and awe, which often envelop the reception of
technological innovation, should not always be associated with the
sublime. This may be the reason why the issue of the so-called
“technological sublime” has been at the periphery of philosophical
scholarship but has become a more focused subject of discussion in
American historiography. David Nye sought to trace a specifically
American technological sublime that stems from American morality and
cultural values, making the implicit philosophic argument that “sublimity
is not inherent but a social construction.”[7] This seems like an
overstatement of the Kantian argument that the sublime is dependent
upon moral ideas. Nevertheless, the issue that seems to arise bears not
on what exactly is the sublime in technology but on how technology can
be a vehicle for the communicability of the sublime and whether this is
hindered or alternatively enhanced by specific cultural mindsets and
social experience.
Hence, as no object is inherently sublime, it would be difficult to
philosophically define a specific technological sublime. It would seem
more useful to examine if and how technology affects the mental and
imaginative incommensurability that creates the sublime in the first
place. Within this kind of problematization, this article will focus on the
increasing enhancement of visualization and mapping techniques. The
sublime is an ability of the imagination, and the fact that technology,
notably through visual media, can widen our oversight of natural and
technical objects is likely to affect the limits of representation. The very
term “technological sublime” seems to denote a difference from the
“natural sublime.” But what this essay will explore is whether the sublime
is a category that creates its own useful distinctions between the
technical and the natural. From this perspective, it will be argued here
that the sublime does not concern merely aesthetics but, as even the
early accounts of the sublime seem to point out, can also be an
analytical tool for several demarcations of the natural and the technical
or the artificial, and help us to better grasp the cultural dimension of
digitality.
2. Was the sublime always technological?
The treatise that was the source for the sublime in modern thought is
pseudo-Longinus’ Peri Ypsoys, a treatise on rhetoric probably written in
the first century ACE, which seems to have been centered on the
limitations of the natural and the technical. A main theme is whether the
appearance of the sublime in discourse is due to a formal rhetorical
training or to an innate ability to evoke and sense sublime experiences.
As Baldine Saint-Girons argues, this introduces a long-standing dilemma
in the history of the sublime as to whether it is subject to physis or
technè.[8] Of course, this distinction does not concern the actual object
that stirs up the feeling of the sublime. It mainly involves the inner
disposition and representative ability of the spectator or the listener. In
other words, the link of a technical element to the sublime is not initially
based on a gigantism or dynamism of a device but on whether the
sublime is the outcome of a natural disposition or of an artificial and
taught method of reasoning.
The solution to this issue in pseudo-Longinus’s treatise seems to lie in a
middle ground, that is, that the sublime must be cultivated through
figures of speech but fundamentally concerns a natural and inner
ability. More specifically, it argues that there is a natural tendency to
push the limits of the human representative faculty, an argument that will
be decisive for the philosophical development of the term even in the
modern period. As pseudo-Longinus informs us, “nature has called us
into life, to the whole of universe, to be spectators of her games and
eager competitors” but at the same time “the whole of universe is not
enough to satisfy the speculative intelligence of the human thought.”[9]
So it is from “natural instinct that we admire not the small streams” but
the “Nile, the Rhine, the Danube and above all the Ocean.”[10] Hence,
the origins of the sublime appear to be in the gray zone between formal
representation abilities and techniques of imagination, verbal or
depictive.
It is useful to point out that Kant argues that the sublime is not primarily
able to reveal the technical dimension of nature. On the contrary, Kant
considers that the beautiful would be more apt to help us locate a
common technical dimension in humans and nature. He points out that
the “self-sufficient beauty of nature reveals to us a technique of nature,”
a technique that is capable of generating the idea of “purposiveness with
respect to the use of the power of judgment in regard to
appearances.”[11],[12] This bears the potential to expand the “concept of
nature, namely as mere mechanism, into the concept of nature as
art.”[13] On the contrary, the sublime exhibits none of these
characteristics and precludes the idea of natural purposiveness, while it
suggests that “the possible use of its intuitions makes palpable in us a
purposiveness that is entirely independent from nature.”[14]
So following pseudo-Longinus, Kant makes the point that the sublime
corresponds to a specific intuitive and innate stratum in human
perception. But Kant was also aware that technical enhancement could
influence the scales and magnitudes that fall within the human range.
Indeed, the philosophical debate of the notion of the sublime in the
eighteenth century was contemporary to a radical enhancement of the
technology of optics. For example, by the time Kant was writing his
Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), William Herschel had already
discovered Uranus through the use of the telescope, the first planet that
cannot be seen with the naked eye, whereas several decades before,
the Dutch Antonie van Leeuwenhoek had discovered  bacteria through a
microscope. That basically meant that the actual limits of representation
were greatly altered by technical apparatuses, an issue that the so-
called “archeology of media” has investigated in depth.[15] In Kant’s
analysis of the sublime, especially in what he coined the “mathematical
sublime,” this change of scale by technical means was already
embedded in human subjectivity. As he explains:
Here one readily sees that nothing can be given in
nature, however great it may be judged to be by us,
which could not, considered in another relation, be
diminished down to the infinitely small; and conversely,
there is nothing so small, which could not, in comparison
with even smaller standards, be amplified for our
imagination up to the magnitude of a world. The
telescope has given us rich material for making the
former observation, the microscope rich material for the
latter.[16]
One may argue that this kind of oscillation between magnitudes and
infinitesimal scales  embraced all the subsequent development of
technical optic devices. However, changes of distant and close vision
are not only the outcome of the technical possibilities of enhancement
but also result from complex phenomenological situations. In Poetics of
Space, Gaston Bachelard went to great length to show the limits
between inner imagination and actual observation, especially in what he
calls “intimate immensity,” whereby the subject can potentially magnify,
by his imagination, every object or image.[17] Commenting on Henry
David Thoreau’s description of nature, he concluded that “any doctrine
of the imagery is necessarily a philosophy of excess, and all images are
destined to be enlarged.”[18]
Yet it does remain a fact that these phenomenological intricacies have
been made rather more concrete since they were materialized in several
techniques of the image. Art played a significant role in this. Since its
inception, ‘the sublime’ has been a term that concerned primarily natural
observation, rhetoric, and poetry. Jonathan Richardson’s An Essay on
the Theory of Painting (1725) is one of the first attempts to specifically
analyze what can be a portrayal of the sublime in painting.[19] As
Lyotard has argued extensively, by the time of high modernism, visual
arts had become a privilege of the sublime.[20] But in addition to art,
modern optical means offered a complex patchwork of spectatorship
that, in a sense, exteriorizes the changes of scale and magnitude that
were once the vehicle of reason and language metaphors. After
telescopes and microscopes, the advent of cinema, video, and today, of
new image techniques such as 3-D modeling, algorithmic processing,
fractals, and so on have created whole new imagescapes where
changes of scale are continuously activated.
The main ground for the appearance of the sublime is the
incommensurability between rationality and representation. According to
Kant, the sublime is generated through a “displeasure” that becomes
manifest when “the subject’s own incapacity [Unvermögen] reveals the
consciousness of an unlimited capacity, and the mind can aesthetically
judge the latter only through the former.”[21] In this case, a subject thinks
it is impossible to grasp the infinite, yet the very idea that she or he can
direct the internal intuitions of the mind towards it produces this kind of
incommensurability that  simultaneously becomes the source of the
sublime. Yet this incommensurability is dependent upon the media of
enhancement, first language and, in the modern period, techniques of
visualization. This was implicit even in the beginning of the term in
pseudo-Longinus’s treatise. The underlying technical question is in what
way can humans modify and enhance their language capabilities in
order to bring forward a sublime experience? But today these
capabilities are also those of visual and digital media. So this issue
becomes all the more crucial in light of technological advances, since
technology seems to shift the gaps of this incommensurability. The
extension and immersion of vision are vital components of these shifts,
which have increased since the nineteenth century to an extent that they
have reached a pervasive cultural range, from the telescope down to
digital effects. This reiterates the question of the technological sublime
by the fact that technology can present new methods that may contest
the very incommensurability between human understanding and
observation. As it will be argued in the next section, this is where the
very idea of a technological anti-sublime comes into play.
3. The technological anti-sublime
The digital may be associated with several cases of sublime ideas. The
unfathomable computing power and interconnectedness that have
spread throughout the entire digital realm bears an unimaginable mass
of data and information that may be deemed sublime. The same can be
applied for the mathematics of digital processing. The application of
algorithmic reasoning and formal logic into programmable hardware was
the starting point of digital technology. This exteriorization of reason into
technical devices could also be the source of sublimity. One may find a
most evident and potent example in the conception of the so-called
Turing Machine that has been the seed for the subsequent growth of
digitality. Turing’s algorithm is mathematically proven to be the simplest
and most potent device of computing. But this kind of model can also be
seen through the prism of the “mathematical sublime,” for Turing’s
Machine can, by definition, have an infinite capacity of function and
computer power.
On the other hand, although the abstract mathematical models and the
inner, largely invisible and non-representable networks of digital
technology are easy to associate with the sublime, the actual software
and devices that have shaped new means of visualization can have the
reverse effect. So even if digitality is based on an unrepresentable mass
of hidden interconnections, Lev Manovich has succinctly noted the fact
that the cleavage between the presentable and the unpresentable is
largely overridden by the abilities of digital mapping. For Manovich, this
creates an effect of “anti-sublime,” where there is a “promise” that the
seemingly unpresentable mass of data and flows of information can be
boiled down to data diagrams and graspable visual patterns. As he
explains:
This promise makes data mapping into the exact
opposite of the Romantic art concerned with the sublime.
In contrast, data visualization art is concerned with the
anti-sublime. If Romantic artists thought of certain
phenomena and effects as un-represantable, as
something which goes beyond the limits of human senses
and reason, data visualization artists aim at precisely the
opposite: to map such phenomena into a representation
whose scale is comparable to the scales of human
perception and cognition.[22]
Lev Manovich’s hypothesis on the anti-sublime may acquire various and
extremely pervasive ramifications in the age of big-data, digital mining,
and ubiquitous interconnections. Of course, data visualization and
diagrams are not a recent invention and have played a key role in
shaping modern and contemporary visual culture. From Florence
Nightingale’s Rose Diagram in Victorian Britain (c. 1859), which
determined the causes of mortality in the Crimean War, thus
establishing hospital hygiene as a key component to war casualties and
public health in general, down to media and science, diagrams have
become a standard component of visual culture. But with digital mapping
this technique has acquired more applicability and immense
informational use.
One may argue that the anti-sublime element is not only to be found in
the narrow confines of digital devices. Meteorology is perhaps a prime
example of how large quantities of data, and, ironically, even the
tremendous meteorological phenomena that provide a common example
for the dynamic sublime of nature, can also be considered as an
example of the anti-sublime. Today, weather maps and forecasts reports
can condense vast movements and powers that were once thought to be
out of human grasp. In addition, any kind of analytic and thorough
mapping, from the biogenetic level, such as the brain and genome
mapping, to that of energy and climate level, can actually transform
unharnessed magnitudes into manageable and presentable information.
On an overall level, one may detect a certain antithesis of sublime and
anti-sublime that lurks in techno-scientific achievements, and this may
also imply two radically different approaches and aesthetic stances: one
fueled by awe and the sublime against the vast space, deep time, and
big data of computation, and one that it is focused on shortening and
bridging  these huge asymmetries between human and natural scales.
This reversal of the sublime in data visualization cannot only claim to
downsize the mathematical mass of data but also to reverse another
feature of the sublime, that is, that it cannot exactly possess
universalized communicability. Kant had already expressed doubts
about the universalizing of the sublime, since it presupposed a
“supersensible vocation” that involves a “moral foundation.”[23] In this
sense, the anti-sublime is not to be thought of as what Arnold Berleant
described as the “negative sublime,” analyzing the reactions and
reception of terrorism. The negative sublime involves the “recognition of
negativity whose enormity cannot be encompassed in either magnitude
or force.”[24] In this case, “death” and “body counts” are the source of
the negative sublime, since they are “beyond measure.”[25] This
effectively stamps the sublime experience with far-reaching distress and
it remains also based on moral grounds. The anti-sublime cancels these
moral underpinnings and transforms any spectacle or data into
universally communicable information and statistics. But what also
seems to be at stake is another notion that is vital to the sublime, namely
that of incommensurability between reason and representation, which
will be examined in the final section.
4. Habit and the demise of incommensurability
Lyotard argued that “the sublime is neither moral universality nor
aesthetic universalization but is rather the destruction of one by the other
in the violence of their differend.”[26] On the contrary, the anti-sublime
annuls this differend by promoting an informational universality and a
universalization of human sensorium, which are unified along the
habitual behavior of users. Visualization and mapping do not only affect
the perceptive plain of technology but also enable the channeling of data
to uses and habits. Intelligent agents, data mining, and economic and
security algorithms, along with many other tools of current digital
technology, have the capacity to turn vast flows of data and actions into
a double-feedback between measurements of user/consumer behavior
and habitual responses. Hence, something that initially seems to emerge
as a sublime mass of interconnections is not only condensed and
displayed graphically but can also be effectively linked to interactive use
and generate habitual rather than contemplative reception.
This can redirect disinterested aesthetics into the realm of habit. Such a
phenomenon is hardly new for technology and audio-visuality. This kind
of redirection was one of the main arguments in Benjamin’s “Work of
Art...” essay, where he privileged distractive-habitual modes of reception
against the traditional optic-contemplative mode of aesthetic
reasoning.[27] The issue of “distraction” and “habit” seems to also have
been solidified in digital environments, provoking more complex
alternations of aesthetic receptivity over the course of
communication.[28]
Hence, the issue of the anti-sublime is largely the outcome of the
relationship between habit and contemporary aesthetics. It would very
useful here to turn to the rather neglected essay of the French
nineteenth-century philosopher Félix Ravaisson, On Habit, which
surprisingly can be very enlightening on the issue of the anti-sublime in
digital media because it also links habit to a crucial notion for the
sublime, namely incommensurability. Ravaisson’s book sets out to
investigate a main philosophical hypothesis, to consider habit not as a
mere reflexive response but as a result of intelligence and change.[29]
As Catherine Malabou notes, this follows a large philosophical tradition
that includes Aristotle, Hegel, and Bergson, which ascribes to habit a
“primary ontological phenomenon” against a second philosophical view,
exemplified in Descartes and Kant, that “sees in habit the epitome of
inauthenticity, a simulacrum of being.”[30] For Ravaisson, habit is
something much more intricate than mere instinct, which is only driven
by biological predispositions. Ravaisson considers habit as a cognitive
borderline for the limits of nature. As he concludes:
Habit is thus, so to speak, the infinitesimal differential, or
the dynamic fluxion, from Will to Nature. Nature is the
limit of the regressive movement proper to habit.
Consequently habit can be considered as a method – as
the only real method – for the estimation, by a convergent
infinite series, of the relation, real in itself, but
incommensurable in the understanding, of Nature and
Will.[31]
Ravaisson suggests that habit points to an incommensurability of
understanding, intelligence (which he actually identifies to will), and
nature, something that is also the building block of the sublime. And as
argued above for the sublime, habit seems also to become, following
Ravaisson, a method for investigating the limitations of natural
dispositions and technical interventions.
However, the anti-sublime announces itself as something able to reverse
all that. For Ravaisson, the exact measurement of habits could reveal
the actual divides of intelligence and nature or, correspondingly, that
between the technical and the natural, but it seems impossible for
humans to conduct such measurement. Yet with the vast computing
capabilities of digital technology, this seems achievable. So if the
sublime had been latently based on the limitations of nature and
technique, the anti-sublime and the infinitesimal measurements of habit
offer indeed the reverse method for estimating the gap between the
natural and the technical. By transforming the sublime into habit, the
anti-sublime invalidates a lot of complexities in the theorization of nature
and implies that the relationship of culture to nature can become an
issue of measurements and habitual behavior and not one of
contemplation and theoretical debate; measurements that are enabled
by the exteriorization and acceleration of human reason in computation.
In this perspective, the anti-sublime appears as a bridle on the sublime
by an instrument. 
Friedrich Schiller’s treatise On The Sublime had, in a certain respect,
prefigured this kind of antithesis. Schiller placed an emphasis on a
dichotomy: on the one hand, the need of man to comprehend and
arrange things, and on the other, the acceptance of the sublime as an
emancipatory effect, where humans come to terms with their inability to
control the natural forces. In this sense, history can also become a
source for the sublime. As Schiller explains: “The world, as a historical
object, is basically nothing else than the strife of the very natural forces
with one another and with man’s liberty, whereas history informs us for
the achievement of this strife.”[32] To history one may today add the
deep time of evolution as well as the prospect of technological
transformation of the natural environment and of the human organism.
The issue of sublime in technology may well subscribe to such a
dichotomy, since technology is arguably establishing itself as a main
carrier of historical changes: (technological) freedom against nature and
the transformability of humanity. As Josef Früchtl recently argued, this is
already evident in some trends of the current worldview, as it can be
exemplified in cinematographic imaginary, reestablishing grand- or
meta-narratives that seems to defy the complex stratifications of
postmodernism and even give rise to new utopian vision for society.[33]
In all these respects, technology does not seem to offer a special or
different kind of sublime over any natural or historical object. It does,
though, seem to be a catalyst in order to understand the latent potential
of this notion in an era with vital shifts in human capacities and scope. In
other words, the sublime may be deemed an aesthetic domain that has
an encompassing ability to adjust to the anthropocene schema in the
planet. As Kant clarifies in the last sections of the Third Critique, the
overall development of judgment through rationality and aesthetics will
help to transform the powers of nature into culture.[34] But a crucial
element in this respect is that, after Kant’s own historical time, these
teleological schemas have been undergoing radical transformations. For
example, Kantian conceptions of natural teleology and purposiveness
are not easily adjusted to contemporary findings of biology.[35] In a
world where these schemas are debated and where the artificial and the
natural seem to be deeply intricate and more difficult to dissociate, the
sublime and its coupling with the anti-sublime may help to reevaluate the
borderline phenomena between nature and technology.
Commenting on Kant’s insistence that the sublime is largely generated
within nature and not art, Adorno had argued:
The sublime draws the demarcation line between nature
and what later was called arts and crafts. Kant covertly
considered art to be a servant. Art becomes human in the
instant in which it terminates this service. Its humanity is
incompatible to any ideology of service to humanity. It is
loyal to humanity only through its inhumanity toward
it.[36]
On the contrary, digital technology seems to replant the anti-sublime
from human reason to nature, making purposiveness and habit a matter
of metrics and mapping. It thus prefigures a kind of humanization of
nature. The question that lies ahead seems difficult to answer: Is this
humanization of nature concomitant with an inhumanity of our
technology? In any case, the relationship of the sublime to technology
seems something more than a survival of classical aesthetic categories
or mere technological awe, and reveals crucial themes that may finally
shape our symbiotic interactions with our devices.
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